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 Abstract: 
This paper questions Heidegger’s interpretation of animals in his 1929-1930 seminar, The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Heidegger denies that animals 
have access to the ‘as such,’ to beings as such, and yet it must be asked if he can maintain this. 
His course is open to two interpretations: either we deny that the binding, encountering, 
struggling, and adapting that Heidegger attributes to animals are possibilities for animals, and we 
thereby make the animal what I call ‘the impossible’—and I provide additional reasons against 
this option by arguing against Heidegger’s interpretation of the central bee experiments—or we 
retain binding, encountering, struggling and adapting in line with my argument and thereby see 
animals as diversified: each kind of animal has different drives/disinhibitions, and so each is in a 
different kind of ‘world.’ To make this argument, Derrida’s later work on this seminar is drawn 
upon. Derrida’s particular deconstructive strategy of asking whether the human actually has what 
it attributes to itself is not pursued here; however, a related deconstructive strategy, concerning 
questioning the purity of the animal realm, is deployed. Making the animal realm pure is the 
result of an operation of a sacrificial structure: animals are sacrificed to maintain the abyssal 
difference of the human. This sacrifice, and the suffering it allows, is enabled by the denial that 








Heidegger’s 1929-1930 seminar course—The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Finitude, Solitude—offers his most sustained treatment on the theme of animality. In this course, 
Heidegger famously puts forward three theses: “the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in 
world, man [i.e., Dasein] is world-forming” (FCM 183). Despite the attention he gives to the 
topic of animality, many have found his conclusions unsatisfactory,1 especially Heidegger’s 
location of the ground of the animal’s poverty of world in a denial of access to beings as beings 
(i.e., beings ‘as such’). My thesis is that, against Heidegger’s claim that there is a radical abyssal 
break between humans and animals, as two rigidly delimited and deeply different groups, we 
should read Heidegger as saying that there are ways in which animals and humans are more alike 
one another, in terms of access to ‘world,’ than his language of abyss might suggest. This is not, 
however, to deny that there are abysses, first, between humans and animals, and, second, 
amongst kinds of animals. 
I will draw on Derrida to pursue this project. Much of Derrida’s later work is involved 
with questions of animality, and, while Heidegger was so insightful and revolutionary in many 
ways with questions regarding humans, Derrida is helpful in pointing out how Heidegger 
remains very much Cartesian regarding animals (TATTIA 146). This is a fertile site for thought, 
as witnessed in the abundance of recent scholarship.2 I claim that we have resources within 
Heidegger’s text to listen to Derrida’s call to take seriously the various ontological differences 
between different kinds of animals. I will not, however, explicitly focus on Derrida’s specific 
deconstructive strategy that consists in questioning whether humans actually have access to what 
they have claimed for themselves (TATTIA 95, 135). The reason is that I think we need to use 
Derrida’s strategy from and for the animal side, so to speak. If Derrida’s larger strategy could be 
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characterized as questioning the purity and presence of supposedly un-contaminated privileged 
realms (see TNS 29-30, 47), then I think we can bring it to bear on the supposed ‘purity’ of the 
animal realm. My paper thus aims to offer a new reading of Heidegger by drawing on Derrida’s 
writings to show that Heidegger’s conclusions focus on differences between humans and 
animals, disregarding important similarities between them, such that animals are not pure of that 
which Heidegger claims exclusively for the human. Indeed, I suggest that some of the key 
differences are an artefact of a sacrificial logic, discussed below. 
I pursue these questions, in part, to be able to implicitly problematize Heidegger’s 
concept of world. A fertile concept, it is at the heart of many texts by Heidegger, and is the most 
central fundamental concept in the 1929-1930 seminar course; it is also at the heart of many of 
Derrida’s analyses of Heidegger’s works. Derrida will even say: “the question of the meaning of 
being, the being of the entity and of the transcendental origin of the world—of the world-ness of 
the world—must be patiently and rigorously worked through” (OG 50). It is my contention that 
Derrida is right here: this central concept should be thought through, and tested at its limits, for 
example, with regards to animality as limit case. My project’s focus, while on animal 
philosophy, also, then, has implications, somewhat in the background, for a way to re-examine 
fundamental ontology by rethinking world. 
Drawing on Heidegger’s own argument, I pursue my points by claiming that animals 
should have ‘more,’ or ‘different kinds’ of, access to beings than he grants: I argue that there is a 
similarity between humans and animals in the interplay of freeing-binding. In reading 
Heidegger’s text, I claim that we are ultimately left with two alternatives, which I refer to as the 
“two alternatives claim.” The first is to take away the binding, encountering, struggling, and 
adapting that Heidegger attributes to animals, and thereby make the animal what I call ‘the 
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impossible’ (since they are closed off to the possibilities of other beings, and it would be 
impossible for us to transpose ourselves imaginatively or otherwise into this kind of closedness 
to being). Analysis of this impossibility speaks against this alternative, as does the argument that 
I provide against Heidegger’s interpretation of the central bee experiments. The second 
alternative is to retain binding, encountering, struggling, and adapting, in line with my argument 
below, and thereby see animals as diversified: each kind of animal has different 
drives/disinhibitions, and so each is in a different ‘world.’ This brings humans and animals closer 
together vis-à-vis world. 
To argue for this, I show, first, that there is a tension between Heidegger’s ideas 
concerning the animal’s access to beings and the animal’s drivenness. Next, I characterize this 
tension, first, as revealing an impossibility in Heidegger’s account of the animal, and, second, in 
its regional ontological status and complicity in traditional sacrificial structures. I claim here that 
the interest in rendering animals as ‘the animal,’ and hence as impossibility, is a strategic-
performative element on Heidegger’s behalf that distances the reader/listener from animality. 
Heidegger, I suggest, achieves this distance through a sacrificial structure in which animals are 
rendered appropriate for rendering, a structure in which they are purified of commonalities with 
the human; this enables them to be processed in, e.g., slaughterhouses, by allowing, as we will 
see, for a sort of purification of the animal-human difference. When I speak of this animal-
human difference, I mean this abyssal difference, before all other differences, that cleanly 
distinguishes ‘the’ human from ‘the’ animal. Although animals in this account are, as I will later 
elaborate, Edenic and lacking in originary violence, this is the condition that opens them to the 
horrific systemic and systematic violence to which we subject them. To close the first section of 
my paper, I then question the evidence for Heidegger’s position, i.e., in the bee experiments. In 
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the second section, I suggest that if animals are not the impossibility they were made out to be—
if they are open to the possibilities of other beings—then, drawing more explicitly on Derrida, 
we should open our theories to diversifications of ways of being: we should multiply the 
differences of and amongst animals. 
The stakes and larger background context of this paper, then, also involve our ever-
expanding use of animals in technological industrialized agribusiness. Articles like Carruthers’s 
(“Brute Experience”), for example, show that the kind of view Heidegger was grounding 
ontologically is still prominent: Carruthers’s article is a few years old (1989), but we witness 
something akin to his belief at play in our societal practices. Some form of the position 
Heidegger is developing has been operative for most of the Western tradition.3 We see it re-
emerging in stimulus accounts of animals (an account Heidegger will ontologically ground in the 
seminar (FCM 254, 256), in bringing together pioneering animal ethologist Jakob von Uexküll’s 
account (FCM 263-4)—which involves something much more radical than mere stimuli—with 
something like a stimulus account); or in the claims that animals are machines or machine-like, 
that they only react and never properly respond (e.g., TATTIA 8). The stakes, then, are high: to 
challenge Heidegger’s view on animals is simultaneously to challenge the views that have 
enabled mass animal slaughter, experimentation and use, as well as those views that have been a 
constant touchstone for us on our way to defining ourselves. 
 
I. Animals and Impossibility 
Heidegger claims that the essence of animality is to be captivated (FCM 258). The animal is 
encircled by a ring of drives such that when the animal encounters a disinhibitor, a particular 
drive is disinhibited and the animal responds accordingly (i.e., a drive is unleashed, and the 
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animal behaves in a particular way). In each and every case, the animal is fully absorbed in its 
drives—it is fully taken by them (FCM 242, 247)—such that it never encounters its disinhibitors 
as such (FCM 257). Indeed, while Heidegger denies the animal many of the traditional things—
language, tool-use, asking questions, encountering objects, awareness of death—for Heidegger, 
these are all rooted in the animal’s inability to encounter beings as beings, and perhaps this way 
of putting it is Heidegger’s novel contribution to the tradition: that animals are deprived of the 
‘as,’ of the ‘as such’ (i.e., they cannot encounter beings as such). There is an important 
distinction here: beings vs. beings as such; animals can encounter the former, but not the latter. 
Conversely, the human, as Dasein, is that which has access to beings as beings (grounded in the 
possibility of access to language, technology, objects, etc.). That is, for example, while an animal 
encounters an apple in the apple’s unleashing of the animal’s drive to eat it, Dasein can 
encounter the apple as raising the question of what it is for an apple to be an apple, what it is for 
the apple to be as such. Because Dasein has access to beings and to beings ‘as a whole,’ Dasein 
‘has’ world or, better, Dasein is world-forming. 
 Another way to put this is that animal behaviour, for Heidegger, reveals itself to us to 
have a fundamentally eliminative character (FCM 249-53). The animal does not encounter the 
entity as an entity (since this entity is always eliminated through behaviour); but rather, and only 
from our perspective, the animal encounters the entity ‘as’ disinhibitor (FCM 252). When an 
animal’s drive, disinhibited by a disinhibitor, is satisfied, the drive is reinhibited in this 
satisfaction, i.e., in the elimination of a particular entity’s character as disinhibitor (e.g., the apple 
is eaten, and the disinhibitor is eliminated). 
To develop a challenge to Heidegger’s claim that only humans encounter beings as 
beings, and to show how animals in fact have a different kind of access than he would allow, I 
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will first study his claim that the animal is bound to its environment. Heidegger makes two 
claims that seem contradictory. He claims, first, that the animal’s “being bound to the 
environment, the self-encircling which is open to disinhibition, belongs to the inner essence of 
behaviour” (FCM 258, my emphasis), and, second, in his discussion of Dasein, that something 
can be bound only if it is also free: “only where there is freedom do we find the possibility of 
something having a binding character” (FCM 339, my emphases). This freedom is the open 
access to beings as beings: precisely what Heidegger denies of animals. It is hard to reconcile 
these claims. Should we see animals as also free in their being bound? 
However, it may immediately be objected that Heidegger clearly does not mean the same 
thing by being-bound in these two contexts: in the one, animals; in the other, Dasein. Heidegger 
is insistent on the abyss between these two (e.g., FCM 264). Furthermore, and more detrimental, 
while the English translation enables a connection, the German reveals that Heidegger does not 
use the same words that get translated as “bound”: in the first case, for animals, he uses 
Verbundenheit, and in the second case, for Dasein, Verbindlichkeit. Finally, as his course 
progresses, Heidegger moves away from “binding” to speak of a “unity” of organism and 
environment (FCM 258). 
Rather than address these objections head on (though I will note in passing that there is 
an ambiguity in the use of the roots of these two German terms (e.g., FCM 327, 329)4; and I will 
also note that even in such “unity,” there is still a question of binding to particular entities 
encountered), I wish to make the following claim, which is a form of the “two alternatives claim” 
foregrounded in the introduction: either we accept Heidegger’s stated position that there is a 
radical break between human and animal binding, or we believe there is good reason to think that 
there is a similarity in binding that Heidegger overlooks. One possibility (i.e., the latter), then, is 
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that, regardless of whether animals encounter beings as such or not, we should adhere to 
Heidegger’s (translated) statement that all binding requires freeing. I will, however, spend most 
of this section examining the other alternative: first, characterizing it and the stakes involved and, 
then, examining the evidence for it. 
It may be objected, with regard to the possibility that all binding requires freeing, that I 
am getting entangled within the concept of binding, which in many cases does not require any 
kind of freedom, for do we not say that a proton is bound to an atom, or that an apple on the table 
is bound (through gravity) to the table? Surely in these cases, such binding does not require 
freedom. While this may be so, such examples are different from the case of animals, insofar as 
the context of the latter is one of access-transposition (FCM 201-12). That is, we do not usually 
say that the proton or apple accesses beings, but Heidegger does want to say that animals have a 
kind of access (FCM 204). We do not even need to think now of animals as being subjects or 
conscious for them to be in the play of freeing-binding. What is at stake here is whether there is a 
‘there’ for animals. But is freedom not what Heidegger touches upon when he claims that 
animals have an openness (FCM 253-5): never an openness to beings as such, yet an openness to 
beings nonetheless? 
 We need to know what kind of openness animals have to beings for Heidegger, and so, to 
pursue this, let us note that, in line with denying that animals encounter beings as beings, 
Heidegger would deny that animals encounter the other as other. Nonetheless, he would affirm 
that animals encounter others (just not ‘as such’), where by ‘other’ I do not simply mean other 
‘agents’ but other beings at all. “When we say that the lizard [i.e., one example among many] is 
lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the word ‘rock’ in order to indicate that whatever the 
lizard is lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, and yet is not known to the lizard 
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as a rock” (FCM 198). But can we say that animals actually encounter what we would call ‘an 
other’ if they cannot encounter an other as such? 
 To encounter an other there must be something akin to a self (see Jonas 67-8; Thompson 
99). Heidegger, however, denies that the animal has a self; yet he does claim that animals have a 
“proper being” (Eigentum) (FCM 233),5 enabling them to be open to the other (FCM 253-4). As 
we will see, however, this openness to the other, as lacking the openness to and of the self, is not 
really an openness. The other, which can be interpreted as a stimulus (FCM 254, 256-7), is never 
really an ‘other,’ as it is always already encountered within a prescribed, driven response of the 
animal (FCM 229, 255). The ‘other’ merely disinhibits a drive without being encountered: the 
animal is entirely taken by its drives, and is not open to the ‘other’ which disinhibits its drive. 
Further, the only ‘others’ to which an animal is ever open are already enfolded ‘within’ it, 
delineated by it, and so are in some sense always already a part of it. As Heidegger puts it: “that 
which disinhibits [i.e., the disinhibitor] correlatively belongs to such behaviour” (FCM 256, my 
emphasis). I claim, then, that Heidegger’s account not only does not enable the animal to 
encounter an other as such, but also does not actually enable the animal to encounter an other, 
despite his claims to the contrary (FCM 254). 
 How are we to understand the animal if it not only does not encounter the other as other, 
but also does not really encounter the other except as already enfolded in its own properness? 
Clearly the animal needs the other to act as disinhibitor (which the animal does not encounter as 
such, or as disinhibitor), but in becoming such for the animal, the other is already encoded within 
the animal’s disinhibiting ring. The animal is taken in its drivenness such that we can say that the 
animal is nothing but this being taken: the animal is the drivenness of its drives, always fully 
contained and fully gathered, in its captivated absorption. The animal is but the play of drives: 
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the driven push-pull in a wordless worldless ‘void’—not even a void, as the animal does not 
even encounter nothing, which is ontologically grounded in being; the animal is withheld from 
being and nothing (FCM 252-3). An implication is that from Heidegger’s position, we also could 
not really say that the animal encounters at all. Heidegger says that things should be crossed out 
when we speak of them ‘for’ animals (e.g., FCM 198) because animals do not encounter things 
as things. We could go further and say that the ‘animal,’ as merely a locus of proper drives, 
could itself be crossed out, as all access is inaccessible for ‘the animal’ (see OS 53)—in being 
driven the animal does not encounter itself nor others, it is just taken. 
 If this is the case, what could Heidegger mean when he speaks of animal leeway? With 
regards to animal leeway (Spielraum), Heidegger writes: “the organism can adapt a particular 
environment into itself only insofar as openness for . . . belongs to its essence, and to the extent 
that […] a certain leeway is created within which whatever is encountered can be encountered in 
such and such a way, i.e., […] through its disinhibiting function” (FCM 264, my emphases; see 
also 248). Yet, as we have seen, the relation between drives and disinhibitors is so interwoven 
that there is no room for freedom. Heidegger cannot mean by leeway a choice of how to respond 
to a situation, for there is nowhere for choice to enter. Rather, the leeway would have to be a 
non-exact coinciding of the disinhibitor to the drive such that what is adapted to is ‘within the 
range’ of the drive’s prescribed responses. So the only way an animal can actually adapt is if it is 
already open to a particular adaptable pathway as within its range. 
My point here is that if animals are open—if they are free—in their binding to the 
environment, such openness must be open, beyond any predelineation. With regards to both 
openness and animal leeway, I claim that animals, for Heidegger, are not actually in a free 
relation. Heidegger writes around the same time (1930): “To free oneself for a binding 
 10 
 
[bindende] directedness is possible only by being free for what is opened up in an open region” 
(P 142). The question is whether it is possible for there to be an openness that is so 
circumscribed as to be only open to that which is prescribed for the entity in question, or whether 
this is “an openness without openness” (EWCS 277), or a freedom without freeing. This is a 
question of limits and totalities. Can an openness be open if it is only limited to what is always 
already enfolded in the entity, such that it never really leaves itself nor encounters an other as 
such? Can there be a boundedness that is total? Or must we say that to be open is to be open 
beyond any such prescriptions and circumscriptions, and to always be open for an outside and 
others that are always already impinging upon any attempt to delimit an inside (see TATTIA 
95)? That is, for Heidegger, if an animal is to encounter a disinhibitor—which it also never 
encounters as a disinhibitor, but which nonetheless somehow ‘triggers’ the disinhibition of a 
drive—then does it not seem as though we should say that the animal in question must be free, 
beyond a pure circumscription within the animal, to encounter it: must it not be open beyond 
what is inscribed for it to be able to encounter it (and if so then the being in question can no 
longer be a pure disinhibitor either6)? Or, is the animal total?7 
 I am pointing to a tension I detect between Heidegger’s claims about, on the one hand, 
the animal’s openness and access to beings and, on the other, his description of animals in terms 
of drives. This is also a question of the “two alternatives claim”—do we take the animal as open 
(i.e., to freeing and encountering) or not (i.e., freeing and encountering are mere external 
descriptions)? To further develop the “two alternatives claim,” I claim that one implication of 
Heidegger’s position is that it seems inconsistent to say, as Heidegger does, that animals struggle 
or adapt, unless Heidegger is speaking only of observations from our external perspective. 
Heidegger claims that life is encircling and struggling (FCM 257). Further, he claims that 
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animals have always already “carve[d] out” (FCM 257) an environment that is adapted into 
themselves (FCM 264). Yet, how can the animal adapt, carve out, or struggle, if there is only an 
openness to what is given as encounterable by its disinhibiting ring, and nothing ever endures 
over-and-against it (FCM 242, 256)? To be more precise, I disambiguate “adaptation” into two 
senses: evolutionary (i.e., species adaptation may involve something like a leeway) and 
individual (i.e., the individual ‘adapts’ its behaviour, which is related to the notion of struggle). 
For the evolutionary sense, I claim that such a leeway should not be taken in a Heideggerian 
sense, i.e., as pre-programmed, pre-enfolded; but, rather, it should be understood as part of a 
dialogic encounter with an environment. I am arguing for a stronger emphasis on the role of 
animals, as beings struggling with and interacting with (i.e., in a give-and-take relation with) a 
shifting and changing environment. 
 For Heidegger, a disinhibitor is always matched up with a drive, which is matched up 
with a capability of the organism (e.g., FCM 221, 231-2). But how could the organism be 
originarily capable, or how could its capabilities change, if it is not open to a leeway beyond 
prescription? Capability must refer to and be directed by and to an environment—a particular 
capability has to ‘fit’ with an organism and an environment—and so it must come to be, or to 
change, through an openness to an environment that cannot be predelineated. 
Otherwise, with regards to Heidegger’s account, how could a struggle exist? There is 
‘nothing’ with which the animal could struggle or to which it could adapt. We would have to say 
that there is a struggle without struggle, or a struggle only from our ‘external’ perspective.8 And 
so, to return to our “two alternatives claim”: do we take struggle and adapting as connected with 
an openness, or not? 
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 To pursue this question on struggle, let us turn to Leung (2010) who questions 
Heidegger’s denial of world on the basis of drives (248-9). Leung points us to a passage from 
Being and Time where Heidegger claims that we cannot accept a theory of Dasein in terms of 
willing, drives, and resistances, because “[with] such willing, however, something must already 
have been disclosed which one’s drive and one’s will are out for” (B&T 210/253). While in the 
context it is clear that Heidegger is speaking only of Dasein, it does seem Leung and I agree 
here: for this is related to my point on how there must be an openness beyond prescription. 
Leung writes: “it is hardly comprehensible how the [animal] can be driven or taken by its food if 
it is not in a position to recognize its food as food in the first place” (248-9, my emphasis). “If 
the behavior of the animal is driven, is it not also necessary that what its drive is out for must 
also have been already disclosed?” (249). Furthermore, and to relate back to my discussion on 
struggle, I think that the passage from Being and Time holds further potential. Later in this 
passage, we read: “The experience of resistance—that is, the discovery of what is resistant to 
one’s endeavors—is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of world” (B&T 
210/253). It seems right that resistance—struggle—cannot itself be a ‘struggle with struggle’ 
unless there is something like the openness to which Heidegger points in Being and Time (see 
also Heidegger (1997), 52). 
 My claim—the “two alternatives claim” again—is that if there is no openness to the 
interplay of freeing and binding, then struggling, adaptation, and even encountering must be 
understood as descriptions of animal behaviour from our perspective, and not as resistance as 
encountered by and for an animal. At this point in my argument, this position still seems to be 
possible, even though it emerges from a tension within Heidegger’s text (i.e., the two 
alternatives) and it is in need of further clarification. At any rate, Krell touches on a similar point 
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when he writes: “The animal wrestles (ringt) in the ring of its world-relation, its having in not-
having; wrestles in order to eradicate beings that were never there at hand for it in the first place” 
(DL 127). Krell is pointing to the same blankness (epitomized in Heidegger’s Durchstreichung: 
the crossing-out) I pointed to above: the animal wrestles-struggles with ‘ghosts,’ which are 
never-there for it. 
 
We will return to the idea of the never-there. To lead to this, I claim that a central issue in our 
discussion concerns how we relate to animals in the first place to make the sorts of claims that 
Heidegger does, and the way this would require a transposition of ourselves into the place of an 
animal, either in order to claim that we can know and access what is going on with the animal, or 
to compare our being to that of the animal, to claim that we are not that sort of entity.9 In 
attempting to do such a transposition, I claim, we run up against limits: we cannot fully transpose 
ourselves into the animal, either epistemologically or ontologically, with priority given to the 
latter. That is, prior to the epistemological limit of not knowing what it is like to be an animal, 
there is an ontological limit of not being that entity. In this part of the paper, I will draw our 
attention to two kinds of impossibility stemming from this observation: first, that fully accessing 
an animal is impossible; second, that, for Heidegger, transposing into the animal is impossible 
because it is not open to the possibility of encountering things due to its disinhibiting ring. 
 This terminology of the impossible comes from Derrida (B&S 148), and I will begin by 
discussing the impossible ontological limit. My observation is that the ontological limit of 
transposition with regard to the animal is in some ways akin to the sort of limit that Derrida 
discusses in relation to our death (B&S 148). As part of Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s oft-
made claim that humans encounter death as such whereas animals do not (i.e., animals just 
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perish: e.g., FCM 267),10 death is understood in terms of the impossible: our thoughts of our own 
death are structurally such that we are always still ‘there,’ we always survive in the fantasy of 
our death (B&S 117, 148-50, 157, 170, 233). This is linked to the spectrality—the phantasm—of 
death in life, of the imagination that gives death a home, lets death ‘live’ in life. My claim is that 
our access to animals is in some ways analogous to our access of death: animals are those into 
which we imaginatively project—but it is impossible for us to fully accomplish this projection. 
This is what I indicate when I speak of our transposition into the animal as ‘impossible’: it is 
impossible for us to be, or fully know, or even fully imagine other animals. 
Crucially, it is because there is a necessary ontological limit—the impossibility—that we 
must imaginatively project into animals as well as into death. This projection is not, however, 
something we occasionally fall into: rather, we have always already projected. We always 
already have an understanding of death just as we do of animals. Our imaginative projection has 
necessarily violated, transgressed, the impossible borderline, and has done so such that it informs 
our experience on ‘this side’ of the line, which is always already both sides. We have a sense of 
animals and of death, not restricted to particular regional spheres; rather, such understandings 
permeate a sense of who we are. 
Of course, it may be objected that this is also the case for other ‘experiences’ of which we 
do not have ‘direct’ experience, whereas, on the other hand, Heidegger’s discussion of death has 
to do with death as primordially constitutive and individuating. In reply, I jump ahead a bit in the 
argument: I claim, while in general the analogy may be weak due to that which the objection 
points out, in Heidegger’s case there is an analogous priority and role for animals: animals and 
death are as limits of the ‘as such.’ In other words, our being-there (Dasein) lost in death is the 
being-there that depends on animality when it thinks itself as exclusively open to the ‘as such’; 
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both death and animals function as an impetus to awaken us to our Dasein. In addition, we 
cannot not imaginatively project, barring a life without animals (and who could imagine this? 
(see TATTIA 79-80, 102)): they are always already encountered within traditional, historic ways 
of relating to them. But, more fundamentally, animals are constitutive insofar as we are like 
them: our animate organism is like theirs. Our likeness is immediately apparent, and needs to 
be—in one way or another (and hence the traditional, historic ways)—reckoned with. 
Recall that Heidegger argues for a possibility of transposition, of accessibility, into the 
animal (FCM 201-4). Yet, by the end of Heidegger’s analysis, we see that this is in some sense 
misleading: we are not able to transpose if we think of transposition as our taking up a place 
occupied by the animal, because the animal fundamentally does not occupy place in the same 
way as Dasein does as being-there. There is no ‘there’ for animals; there is no place in which the 
animal could occur. As touched on before, just as the other is never-there for the animal, so the 
animal is never-there for itself, either. For Heidegger, the animal is a kind of no-place, and, 
additionally, is deprived of any possibilities that it could sense as possibilities (see Agamben 68). 
Our transposition into the animal thus involves a particular kind of phantasmatics of the animal, 
an impossible, imaginary projection into the animal that ‘discovers’ the projection as additional 
impossibility; Heidegger’s account of the animal as outside of the play of freeing-binding, I 
claim, doubles the impossibility. For him, the animal is suspended (FCM 248): between self and 
other (FCM 233), “between itself and its environment” (FCM 248), between being open and 
being closed (FCM 248), between having and not having world, between permanence and 
change (FCM 254). Heidegger’s projection beyond the unavoidable ontological limit of animals 
reveals a utopic uniformity: u-topic in the sense of no-place, and uniformity in the sense that this 
is supposed to be the essence of all animals—the animal (FCM 186). 
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In other words, this second impossibility is as follows: Heidegger projects across the first 
impossibility—he transposes across the limit—to report back that transposition is impossible: to 
say there is no place, he takes up a place. Heidegger accesses the animal to say that access for it 
and to it is impossible. From a Heideggerian perspective, then, it is impossible to imagine the 
animal’s being from the ‘inside’11—there could not be such an interiority/perspective. Therefore, 
from Heidegger’s place, he finds the animal as placeless, as utterly inhospitable: to try to 
imagine Heidegger’s animal from the ‘inside,’ one must imagine oneself away: one must 
imagine one’s utter absence, the absence of all possibilities, i.e., the impossible absence of being-
there—one’s death. The animal is, imaginatively, death: its alterity, for Heidegger, confronts us 
with something as radical as the impossibility of death.12 Just as Derrida points out the 
impossibility of Dasein accessing death as such (for then the impossibility of our possibilities 
would be a possibility (see Derrida (1993), 75), or, as put earlier, we would survive the fantasy), 
so too it is impossible to project into animals understood as the loss or absence of being-there for 
the exact same reason: there is the parasitic structure of our survival (of our “there”). As death is 
not a possible phenomenon for us, neither, on Heidegger’s account, is transposition into the 
animal. But let us say, instead of speaking of an animal’s perspective, we take a Heideggerian 
perspective from ‘outside’ the animal: we observe its behaviour, for instance, and conclude that 
the animal is poor in world. Nonetheless, such evidence—and the bee experiments will be 
examined in detail later—must be related to the animal’s being, i.e., it must relate to a 
transposition. 
In short, the second impossibility has a double sense in which, first, the animal, which is 
supposed to have access (FCM 201-12), cannot have any possibilities of its own (e.g., 
encountering beings); and, second, therefore Dasein does not have the possibility of imagining 
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animal access—animals are impossible to comprehend because they do not have possibilities. 
Finally, then, Heidegger’s projection is impossible because Heidegger does imagine animal 
access as a possibility. 
The phantasm of the doubly impossible animal is an imaginary projection into the animal. 
On what terms, on whose terms, does such a projection occur? How can we best understand 
Heidegger’s take on animality in this seminar? I draw here on an article by Withy (2013). 
Heidegger’s seminar is basically made up of four sections on: a) philosophy/metaphysics; b) 
profound boredom (as a way to study Dasein’s fundamental attunement to the world); c) world, 
through a comparative analysis between, primarily, Dasein and the animal; and d) the structure 
of the logos, by working through Aristotle. Commentators have at times been confused as to the 
unity of this seminar, and Withy convincingly argues for one. Withy notes that in the section on 
boredom, the everyday way of being of Dasein seems animal-like: Dasein is fascinated, turning 
towards beings, forgetful of itself as Dasein. Withy helps us see that the section on animality fits 
into the overall project insofar as it spells out how the apparent similarity between Dasein and 
animality is mistaken, and that humans are not like animals in important ways (e.g., FCM 282). 
Heidegger’s project is to use animality—as he conceives it—as a way to draw out Dasein’s 
central, and I claim anthropocentric, role vis-à-vis being. That is, for Heidegger, being requires 
Dasein as that which is open to it; this is anthropocentric because it presumes only humans are 
open to being. In other words, Heidegger’s conception of the animal/human difference neglects 
the kind of openness—pointed to in one alternative of the “two alternatives claim”—that I am 
arguing we find in animals. In this respect, Withy helpfully indicates how ‘the animal’ is, for 
Heidegger, a kind of strategic caricature meant to therapeutically motivate us (Withy 170, 172-3, 
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175), to make us stop being the “ape[s] of civilization” (FCM 5; see also 161, 179), and to grasp 
the central role of Dasein. 
In other words, Heidegger’s imaginary projection into animals is meant to distinguish 
Dasein as essentially non-animal. The animal is precisely that being like us that nonetheless is 
abyssally not-us because the animal is ‘prior’ to the disruption that enables the ontological 
difference—the difference between beings and being, which is at the root of the ‘as such.’ The 
animal has not been, and presumably for Heidegger will never be, gripped or disrupted 
essentially by ontological difference—that is, as I will say, the animal is ‘pre-ontological 
difference.’13 As an amendment to the claims made that animals are incapable of grasping the 
ontological difference (see Calarco (2004), 22; Franck 144), I claim that, as a precondition, the 
ontological difference has not gripped them. The desire on Heidegger’s behalf is to situate, to 
awaken Dasein—precisely at the cost of sacrificing animals for this purpose, that is, sacrificing 
and purifying the being of animals for the sake of rendering an all too clear difference between 
humans and animals. Drawing on Lawlor, we can call this a “scapegoat structure” (TNS 98): 
through a play of substitution, that which is inside is expelled to the outside to symbolize the 
expulsion of the contaminating force. In the case of animals, there is a twofold structure: first, we 
‘conceptually’ sacrifice them to affirm their purity and our impurity (as will be seen) through 
denying our kinship with animals, which also affirms the pure separation of human/animal; 
second, this then enables, for example, religious rites of purification for ourselves. 
The hidden “sacrificial structure” (EWCS 278-283, passim; VAA 71), operating first and 
foremost on an ontological level, is not unique to Heidegger, but rather shows its rootedness 
further back in our tradition. Animals are ‘revealed’ as a pre-ontological difference. Lacking 
originary violence,14 they are not cast out into the play of difference (i.e., difference of being and 
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beings, and difference amongst beings); they are not gripped, called upon, or, I claim, chosen; 
they are not in history. They are not gripped by Walten—an originary sovereign force, a German 
word that Derrida draws our attention to in The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol. II as permeating 
Heidegger’s work (e.g., FCM 26, 34, 349, 362, 365). Animals are not open for an ‘es gibt’ (P 
254-5), the givenness of beings, the generosity—only for Dasein (hence, I claim, why Heidegger 
speaks of the poverty of animals, that animals are poor in world). Animals are not dis-placed 
from themselves and others such that there is a difference between self and other. These points 
connect Heidegger back to the Judeo-Christian tradition: animals are pre-binaries; paradisiacal; 
Edenic.15 Animals have not been thrown, they do not fall, they are no-where, u-topos. They are 
not aware of themselves. Animals are a ‘space,’ a gap, that cannot be filled, cannot be spoken: 
they are not a being-there. 
We, however, are essentially disrupted (P 145):16 this displacement creates, allows for, 
place. Suddenly, in an Edenic way, we encounter death as death;17 we also encounter the 
possibility of ethics (violence is opened), technology, language, etc. The paradisiacal, however, 
exists as an imaginary projection—it is a violent projection, the impossible, in which what is 
projected is the unviolated, unviolable: the animal as total, pure, paradisiacal. We cannot harm it, 
so we say. (Being told you are Edenic is one of the worst violences that could be done to you 
(see TNS 23).) 
The originary violence enables Dasein’s being as ek-static, whereas animal being is only 
static. Even while eliminating the disinhibitors in their disinhibiting role, the animal is immured 
in its captivated absorption; thus, even though the animal is a constant drivenness (FCM 243), it 
is also a constant stasis. This is contrary to Dasein, who “ex-sists” (FCM 365; e.g., P 247): “The 
stasis of the ecstatic consists […] in standing in the “out” and “there” of unconcealedness, which 
 20 
 
prevails as the essence of Being itself” (P 284). Dasein is ek-static in its violent emergence from 
itself in which it never leaves itself behind (FCM 363).18 
In other words, and in line with Derrida (see TATTIA, passim; OS 110-3), Heidegger’s 
conception of the human/animal difference very much resonates with a Judeo-Christian 
understanding. This is a way to suggest that Heidegger’s fundamental ontological project retains 
traces of regional ontologies; there are, of course, always traces and never a blank slate, never 
blankness. Relatedly, we could also note that insofar as Heidegger’s project aims to reveal the 
pre-grounding of the sciences, he makes a decision to foreclose on other kinds of disclosures of 
truth. For instance, in removing the stone from discussion (the stone is worldless, he claims, and 
then focuses on animal and Dasein), Heidegger states that it is possible for the stone to be seen 
as animated—but, nonetheless, we will stay within our particular truth-disclosure: “What is at 
issue here is […] the distinction between quite different kinds of possible truth. But for the 
moment [which is the ‘moment’ of the entire seminar, and beyond], in accordance with the 
subject under consideration, we shall remain within that dimension of truth pertaining to 
scientific and metaphysical knowledge” (FCM 204).19 In other words, as he points to the 
possibility of other disclosures, he also immediately forecloses on their investigation. 
If we accept that the phantasm is necessary with regards to animals, that there is the 
primary impossibility of transposition (due to the ontological limit), then we are led to the 
following question: why think in Heidegger’s way? At this point, just as a particular onto-
theological tradition that has devalued animals makes itself known to us, just as we have seen 
some of the investments involved with taking one alternative of the “two alternatives claim,” it 
becomes important to ask: why not think in other ways? Why Heidegger’s? Why not take the 
other alternative of the “two alternatives claim”? One site to further tease out these investments 
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while simultaneously questioning further Heidegger’s account is in examining the evidence 
Heidegger marshals in support for his position: in particular, the central bee experiments (FCM 
241-3). 
 
Leading up to the bee experiments, Heidegger states that while his terminology might seem 
arbitrary, it is grounded in a substantive interpretation (FCM 236-7), and so he promises to 
examine his recently-made bold claims (FCM 240). He discusses the bee flying in a meadow (the 
bee, he claims, is exemplary (FCM 241)): peppering the passage with questions, he asks whether 
the bee encounters presence (i.e., does it encounter a being as a being, such that the being 
presences?), then, frustratingly, merely asserts that it does not (FCM 241). 
To force the issue, he then discusses an experiment in which a bee is placed in a lab in 
front of a bowl of honey. The bee drinks it up and flies away. However, when the bee’s abdomen 
is cut off while it is drinking, the bee continues to drink as honey runs out of its backside. For 
Heidegger, this shows that animals do not encounter beings as present: the bee does not 
encounter the presence of the honey, nor even the absence of its abdomen, but merely drinks 
until its urge to drink, which was disinhibited, is satisfied; of course, this does not occur in this 
case, because its abdomen, that ‘location’ which registers such ‘satiation,’ is gone (FCM 242-3). 
Therefore, the bee does not encounter presence nor the ‘as such,’ and this helps confirm 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the animal’s essence as captivation. 
 It is because the bee is taken in by the food—or, more accurately, by its drive as 
disinhibited by the disinhibitor (honey)—that it cannot stand over-against or opposed to the 
honey as such. The evidence for this claim is found in the behaviour: the bee does not respond or 
react to either its abdomen being cut off nor to the copious amounts of honey being ‘consumed.’ 
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In other words, it is because the bee’s behaviour is modified, insofar as it no longer stops doing 
what it otherwise would stop doing, that we must say its responses/reactions must be pre-
programmed (FCM 243). Heidegger’s claim is that such a drivenness does not clear the space for 
the ‘as such.’ Notice the leap here: behaviour indicates the lack of the ‘as such’ insofar as the 
behaviour does not proceed along lines anticipated by a human observer (e.g., investigation by 
the bee of the place where its abdomen used to be). First assumption: drivenness precludes the 
‘as such.’ Second assumption: access to the ‘as such’ enables a particular range of response. This 
range would not involve simply continuing along ‘regular’ lines (that is, if the bee had flown 
away as usual, though this for Heidegger enables what he takes to be a misinterpretation (i.e., 
that the bee encounters presence), it could still also be interpreted in Heidegger’s way (i.e., the 
abdomen was not the ‘location’ of satiation, yet the bee is still simply taken)). Nor would this 
range simply involve continuing what would otherwise be stopped (e.g., ceaselessly sucking up 
the honey). Rather, it would involve picking up a new kind of behaviour—perhaps located in 
questioning (Fragen), which Heidegger denies of animals (FCM 364). But what kind of 
behaviour—across which threshold—would indicate an animal’s access to the ‘as such’? 
This further raises the question of what enables the particular behaviours described by 
Heidegger to stand in for all behaviour (see Calarco (2004), 26; Leung 244)? What enables the 
bee to be taken as exemplary for all animals? Why should the bee (rather: a bee (Morris (2005), 
53)) stand in for apes, dolphins, turtles, pigeons, and squirrels (see TATTIA; Calarco (2004), 26; 
Calarco (2008), 23)?  
In addition, as Buchanan (2008) points out, there is a problem in Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the bee experiment insofar as the loss of organic unity—the cutting off of the 
abdomen—should, by Heidegger’s earlier points, fundamentally affect behaviour: 
 23 
 
[O]ne would have to think that the removal of the bee’s abdomen is not simply the 
removal of a part from the whole, which would suggest a mechanist view [which 
Heidegger spends much time arguing against (FCM 212-36)], but that its removal affects 
the bee’s being as a whole. Remove an arm or a leg, to say nothing of an internal organ 
like a stomach or the bee’s abdomen, and you witness a disruption in the overall 
behaviour (Buchanan 82; see also Morris (2005), 59). 
If the loss of organic unity would affect behaviour through and through, then we should not say 
that the experiment shows the ‘location’ of what registers satiation, but instead that it reveals 
Heidegger’s position as presupposed. This is the case because the experiment—operating with a 
loss of organic unity, with an over-generalization of animals as well as behaviours, and with 
undefended assumptions about the ‘as such’—does not provide evidence for Heidegger’s 
position on its own. 
There also seems to be a particular kind of irony here insofar as, in this experiment, we 
deprive a bee of its organic unity in order to make a point about its deprivation in world (i.e., that 
the animal is poor in world). Is this actual deprivation of the bee’s ‘world’—its literal crossing-
out—a necessary precondition to demonstrate the bee’s (supposed) ontological deprivation of 
world? Is the suffering of the bee—disregarded by both experimenter and Heidegger—necessary 
at all? The experiments which, for Heidegger, reveal ‘the’ animal’s previously concealed 
ontological orientation (i.e., concealed in its natural setting: we must interrupt its regular course) 
tend to involve deprivation, alteration, and working on ‘the’ animal’s vulnerabilities: they 
deprive animals of their environment, of that with which they are familiar: e.g., by putting them 
in labs, by moving the bees’ homes, etc. (FCM 242-6). 
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In this cruelty (a poverty) that does not see itself as such, the bee is sacrificed (see 
Calarco (2004), 26). Further, I claim this sacrifice has a tripartite structure: first, the bee is 
actually killed in the experiment; second, the bee—this particular bee—is sacrificed as an 
example, as a representative of the animal in order to confirm the essential difference between 
animal and Dasein (see Calarco (2004), 26); third, all animals (each particular animal—e.g., 
emus, aardvarks, and even bees) have already been sacrificed and purified to ‘conceptually’ 
become ‘the animal,’ such that this bee can act as confirmation of the animal as lacking in 
essential openness. Subsequent to the ‘conceptual’ work, sacrificial re-enactments, or 
demonstrations founded on such, can easily hearken to ‘the animal’ as self-evident. Each animal, 
in its likeness to us, is purified of this likeness—of the originary violence—to be then put outside 
the play of violence. Each sacrificed animal reaffirms this decision, and reaffirms the animal as 
pure. 
While this particular sacrifice occurs in the context of a scientific experiment, Heidegger 
does not draw attention to how modern techno-science may be playing into how the bee appears 
for us. Heidegger will later claim that science consists in a “projection within some realm of 
what is […] of a fixed ground plan of natural events” (QCT 118), wherein the projection 
“secures for itself its sphere of objects” (QCT 118; see also 122-3). As pointed out by Calarco 
(2004), bees are placed in labs as objects for us to work on, as resources for experimentation in 
which any given bee (of a particular kind) could be substituted for any other, and in which an 
essential disruption is made to its environmental-being (from meadow to lab), as well as to its 
group-being (from hive to isolated bee) (Morris (2005), 53, 55): “it is highly revealing […] that 
Heidegger has nothing to say about the domination of life in these experiments […] despite his 
railings against the techno-scientific domination of nature” (Calarco 25-6). 
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Elsewhere, Heidegger relates various animal behaviours and ‘objects’ of animal 
behaviours: nourishment, propulsion, enemies/hostilities, escape/pursuit, prey/seizing/devouring, 
assimilation, growth, digesting/organic processes, inheritance of acquired characteristics, 
reproduction/sexual mating, nest-building, rearing young, seeing, hearing, playing, “and so on” 
(FCM 198, 204, 234, 237, 239, 250). While such a list seems exhaustive, there are problems with 
it. The delimitation of behaviours out of a manifold of ‘activity’ is not simply neutral. Rather, it 
is a particular way that animal activities are allowed to appear such that they are encapsulatable 
as particular behaviours, able to be perceived by the human, able to be catalogued, observed, and 
followed. These behaviours can act as objects for the scientist (e.g., QCT 118, 122-3), but 
animals’ activities are never, I claim, so drily delineated: nourishment is never just 
‘nourishment.’ Derrida says: “Of course, the animal doesn’t eat like us, but neither does any one 
person eat in the same way; there are structural differences, even when one eats from the same 
plate! . . . But what I wanted to suggest […] is that these differences are not those between “as 
such” and “not as such”” (TATTIA 159). Though it clearly is possible in certain circumstances 
that for us nourishment is just ‘nourishment’ (e.g., under scientific gaze), there is always a 
‘more’ in actions. 
All of these ways of encapsulating activities as behaviours and animals as ‘the animal’ 
lead me to coin, drawing on Heidegger’s ‘standing-reserve’ [Bestand] (e.g., QCT 17) and on 
Derrida’s work on sacrifice (e.g., EWCS 278-283, passim; TATTIA, passim; VAA 71), the term 
‘sacrificial-reserve’: in other words, there is a reservoir of animals, standing by, ready to be 
sacrificed so as to symbolically extract and muster the human/animal difference. This reserve is 
always being drawn on to maintain sacrificial relations both for human exceptionalisms and, 
intimately related, for animal purification. Just as modern technology has made factory farms 
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standing-reserves, and modern science has made experimental animals research objects, so too 
‘the animal’ ensures that animals are sacrificial-reserves: we can tap them for our reaffirmation 
of their sacrificial nature. This is then written into the human itself: the human is, in our familiar 
axiomatics, a ‘sacrificial subject,’ constituted by excluding and sacrificing others (see TNS 98; 
TATTIA and EWCS, passim).20 
The animal as sacrificial-reserve is forgotten because it founds the animal as marketable, 
fungible and liquid, abstracted into the general circulatory flow in the system of value. Animals 
are exchanged, meat is exchanged. But this exchange is predicated on a separation that is 
instantiated by a suppressed and yet recurrent and ongoing sacrifice. Derrida’s phrase seems 
fitting here: we can call this a “war of the species” (TATTIA 31; see Coetzee 58-9). Humans 
keep animals as sacrificial-reserve to continuously carry out the operation of purification: my 
claim is that humans have made animals—as ‘the’ animal—a realm of purity, wherein such 
purity is reaffirmed through ‘demonstration,’ a demonstration that reveals our abyssal difference 
(e.g., through the bee experiments). 
In summary, the bee experiments do not show what they intend: rather, they are riddled 
with questionable assumptions and so I have interpreted them as a sacrificial enactment; they end 
up showing more than they allege to show when we grasp what is underneath. As such, the 
evidence Heidegger marshals for his take on animals as doubly impossible—that is, not only due 
to the necessary ontological limit which makes full access impossible, but also due to the 
impossibility of transposition into a being that, as the never-there deprived of possibilities as 
possibilities, is supposed to have access (i.e., for Heidegger, the imaginary projection across the 
impossible limit accesses an additional impossibility: he projects in, crosses the impossible limit, 




To conclude this first section, I again put forward the “two alternatives claim”: either we modify 
Heidegger’s account of animality to remove the ideas of binding, encountering, struggling, and 
adapting (taking them explicitly as external descriptions on our part)21 thereby making ‘the 
animal’ the doubly impossible (or, perhaps more accurately: making ‘the animal’ completely 
machine-like, a pure stimulus being22), or we retain these ideas (i.e., binding, encountering, 
struggling, and adapting, as possible for animals) and thereby modify parts of the rest of the 
account. If we choose the former, we need to explain why we would accept Heidegger’s account, 
and I believe my analysis of the bee experiments and of the doubly impossible nature of 
Heidegger’s account helps to throw this into question (i.e., his account, while it is a—I do not 
say logical, but perhaps rather imaginative—possibility, is also an implausibility). If, however, 
we choose the latter, then animals are freed to have ‘more’ access to beings, for then we cannot 
take the other as merely enfolded within a particular animal.23 
However, in using the word ‘more,’ I do not merely mean to return us to the pre-
theoretical position Heidegger initially criticizes, viz. difference in access as quantitative 
difference (i.e., that we can access more things than the animal can) (FCM 195). As we have 
seen, for Heidegger, ‘poverty in world’ is not that humans can access more beings than animals: 
it is that animals do not have access to beings as such at all (FCM 193-4). So instead, I mean this 
‘more’ in relation to Heidegger’s end point. In other words, Heidegger situates animals as 
absolutely deprived, all equally deprived of, as I have claimed, the ‘es gibt’ (of being-given). To 
‘free’ animals for ‘more’ access means, first, to deny the particular impossibility of Heidegger’s 
account; and, second, to diversify animals, to multiply the differences, so each has its own 
different relations. So, first, ‘more’ relative to absolute deprivation; and, second, ‘more’ in 
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internal complications and diversifications within what was formerly thought (by Heidegger, for 
example) as ‘the animal.’ I am arguing for fundamentally different kinds of openness. 
 
II. Derrida: Multiplying the Differences 
In this section, I argue, as I have done implicitly or explicitly throughout, that we must, 
following Derrida, reject the construct that is ‘the animal,’ as well as reject the dichotomy 
between the ‘as such’ and the ‘not as such’: a dichotomy that for Heidegger clearly maps onto 
Dasein/the animal. If, first, we take the disjunction from the last section as suggesting that we 
should think of animals as having ‘more’ access to beings, and if, second, we take seriously 
Heidegger when he begins to differentiate between kinds of animals—as explained below—then 
I think our analysis joins up with these two key points in Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I 
Am. This section, then, aims to offer some sense of direction in which a different account of 
animality may take root. 
To pursue this, we need to take stock of what Heidegger says to differentiate kinds of 
animals. His overall analysis is explicitly about animality in general: it is meant to apply to each 
and every animal (FCM 186). Nonetheless, he does allow that different animals have different 
disinhibiting rings with different disinhibitors (FCM 257). If, however, as I have argued, we 
think that animals are in the play of freeing-binding, and if different kinds of animal have 
different kinds of rings, then I claim we should think of animals, in each case, as different in 
their access to beings, based on the kind of animal.24 In other words, we can proceed to diversify 
our account of ‘the animal’; that is, we see how each kind of animal has different 
‘drives’/‘disinhibitions’ and so each is in its own, unique and different, ‘kind of world.’ That is, 
there is not just one abyss; rather, there are many, between different kinds of animals. 
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In other words, maybe animals do not encounter beings like we do. But there are many 
ways to interpret this, to phantasize about it. Access requires freeing-binding. To be able to 
‘reach out’ from one’s being requires the freedom to bind oneself to an other ‘outside’ of one’s 
self, which requires a freedom to let the other be. In Heidegger’s terms, there are different 
disinhibiting rings for different kinds of animals. While it is true that there is an account of 
difference here, it is only ever as diversifications of the same: i.e., without access to the ‘as 
such.’ “[I]ndividual animals and species of animals are restricted to a quite specific manifold of 
possible stimuli” (FCM 257, my emphases; see also 247, 265). That is, all animals are animals; 
they are, as Derrida puts it, l’animot. Rather, building off of my previous argument, let us 
actually diversify, let us turn to the phenomena themselves: as each animal has different 
drives/disinhibitions, so each, in its own variegated way, encounters what it encounters. 
The two key points my analysis joins up with are Derrida’s points on l’animot and on the 
‘as such’/‘not as such’ dichotomy, and I follow these as clarified by Toadvine (2010). First, 
Derrida’s use of l’animot (e.g., TATTIA 37, 40-1, 47-8; see also 23-4, 31, 34) is such that, in 
French, it sounds like the word for the plural of animal (animaux) but it singularizes it (le; l’): 
that is, we hear, jarringly, the singularization in the plural. In addition, while animot sounds like 
animaux, l’animot is spelled differently, so as to chimerically combine the words for animal and 
word (mot). Derrida’s point with this word is at least threefold: first, it draws our attention to the 
discrepancy between those in the Western tradition (e.g., Heidegger) who have consistently 
spoken of ‘animals’ but as one large category which lacks something in relation to humans, and 
so are actually speaking of ‘the animal’; second, in its chimerical roots, it mimics the way that 
‘the animal’ as catch-all category is meant to denote such disparate kinds of beings from an emu 
to a whale (i.e., it combines disparate animals into one ‘thing,’ one concept, analogous to the 
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Chimera (TATTIA 41-2)); finally, it shows that ‘the animal’ is constructed as a word, a category 
that we who call ourselves humans have created. 
 Derrida’s point is that we should rigorously question the violence imposed by, and 
enabled by, a category such as ‘the animal’ (see also OS 57): the emu and whale are not 
assimilable, from a phenomenological perspective, to this one concept.25 This violence relates to 
the earlier point that Heidegger’s desire is to sacrifice animals for Dasein: to distinguish Dasein, 
Heidegger sacrifices all animals to l’animot. Therefore, contra-McNeill (1999; see also Schalow 
(2006)), who says Heidegger’s focus on Dasein is justified as laying the ground for ethics 
(McNeill 245), we must see ethics earlier, in the enabling violence itself (see Calarco (2008)). 
However, as Toadvine clarifies, Derrida nonetheless maintains an abyssal difference 
between humans and animals; this is because we are multiplying the differences (Toadvine 251): 
there are abyssal differences not only between humans and different kinds of animals, but also 
amongst kinds of animals (VAA 66, 72-3): for example, the emu and whale. The solution to 
anthropocentrism is not a biologism wherein we argue that we too are animals, as this ‘solution’ 
merely preserves the categorical problem and attempts to efface or ignore essential difference 
(see TNS 72; Toadvine 244-5, 248-54; OS 39-40, 56, 73). 
Connected with this point is Derrida’s move to deny the opposition of the ‘as such’ and 
the ‘not as such’ (TATTIA 156): for Heidegger, Dasein has access to the ‘as such,’ and animals 
do not. But what does it mean to say that entities are either given as beings or not given (‘as 
such’)? Derrida wants to contest that there are only two options: that being is some kind of 
binary on/off switch (‘on’ for Dasein, ‘off’ for animals). Rather, we must multiply how beings 
can appear. This joins up with Heidegger’s own project of paying attention to the kinds of being 
to which we are responding: he criticizes everyday theorizing for taking the beings of nature as 
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all equally ‘just there’ “like the wall that it becomes when turned into an object” (FCM 278). 
Ironically, he then erects ‘animals’ as just such a wall: all animals have the same ontological 
sense. In doing so, he maintains perhaps the key element of traditional metaphysics: 
anthropocentrism (Calarco (2008), 33). 
While I am not entirely clear on how the project called for by Derrida would play itself 
out, I want to offer a few further preliminary thoughts here. A non-anthropocentric view would 
not, I contend, find the solution in dismantling the basic binary of ‘as such’/‘not as such’ and 
then replacing it with a continuum ranging from ‘as such’ on one side to ‘not as such’ on the 
other. Undoubtedly, in such a conception, we would place ourselves on the side closest to ‘as 
such’ and lifeforms like single-celled organisms closest to the opposite side of ‘not as such’; 
however, our goal is not to reinstate a ‘great chain of being.’ Rather, we need to explode this way 
of thinking: it is not clear why we should think we are most in the open; it is not clear why there 
should be a hierarchy at all.26 
Furthermore, one obvious difficulty in such a project of diversification is that no outward 
signs or behaviour could help us directly pinpoint an animal’s kind of access (i.e., we cannot 
completely eradicate the phantasm). It is clear, however, that certain things matter to certain 
animals; different things matter, have a different sense, in different ways to different animals. 
And, I claim, animals do ask questions in their behaviour: for example, the dog who smells the 
dead sea animal seems to behaviourally ask, “is this food?” Strolling down the street, 
encountering another canine, a dog seems to ask, “are you friend or enemy?” This is an openness 
and responsibility. Things matter to animals and they differentiate (themselves and others, in the 
play of differences): “Sense entails differences that make a difference” (Morris (2013), 329). 
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Animals, in this sense, consciously or not, suffer. For Derrida, Bentham’s great 
question—“Can they suffer?”—derives its power specifically from its overturning of the whole 
tradition of basing the human/animal difference on an ability, a power, that the human has and 
animals do not (e.g., the ability to encounter beings as beings: i.e., the ‘as such’). Bentham’s 
intervention is to ask about animals’ “power as non-power” (i.e., are they able to suffer; are they 
able to not be able): that is, their vulnerability, their passivity and passion, “the first possibility as 
non-power that we share with the animal, whence compassion” (B&S 243-4). Furthermore, 
Derrida argues that power has at its heart a vulnerability, a non-power: while each power grants 
what is granted to it, each power also reveals an impotence in the necessity to be granted and to 
maintain itself in this granting of the power (B&S 235; see also TATTIA 27-29; and Heidegger 
(1997), 151-2). Therefore, poverty reveals itself as primary for all lifeforms (see Oliver 123). 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I claim that this point about the pervasiveness of poverty was clearly already at 
work earlier in my argument, insofar as my concern was to criticize the view that animals are 
static and only Dasein is ek-static. In other words, we need to question the move that makes ‘the’ 
animal the pre-ontological difference, the pre-originary violence, thereby making it a bastion 
outside violence and harm. Such a move enables the horrific treatment of animals in factory 
farms, etc., as extractive resources outside of all (or much) moral concern. My arguments were 
meant to question the animal in its purity as instead always already contaminated: in other words, 
the fall from pre-ontological difference which institutes ethics, politics, etc., is not an originary-
constant falling from an originary total purity. Rather, animals in their various kinds of being, 
similar to Dasein, are always already exposure, ek-stasis, violence, and disrupture. It is by 
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denying this, through sacrifice, that animals are taken as purified, yet their kinship here with us is 
primary. 
That which calls on us as condition of anything else calling upon us (as one who can be 
called) (see Derrida on the Zusage: OS 94, 129-132; TATTIA 166) is this disruption, which 
enables differences to matter. If this is true, if there is this releasing that releases all releasing—
frees all freedom—then how can we deny it of animals? How can animals be denied this, if they 
are able to encounter anything at all? Suffering is originary. Vulnerability, ruin, and death are 
always already imprinted, even of course beyond animality. Heidegger, then, tries to seal off play 
(freeing-binding) to indicate a realm of purity, the uncontamination of the animal. But it is hard 
(impossible) to imagine any totality that is not always already open to its ruination.27 
 My response, then, has been to claim that Heidegger takes animals as doubly impossible. 
I examined Heidegger’s evidence for his position in the bee experiments and cast doubt on 
whether these do what they are supposed to do. Rather, to maintain Heidegger’s position, some 
other evidence would be required, and this would also have to rule out animals as open to others. 
In addition, my discussion of the bee experiments suggests difficulties for just such a project. 
Specifically, I argued that the evidence that Heidegger extracts is not (barring further arguments) 
convincing since it relies on: the loss of organic unity; the hasty over-generalization of several 
particular forms of behaviour; the hasty over-generalization of animals as ‘the animal’; the 
assumption that drivenness precludes the ‘as such’; the assumption that the ‘as such’ enables an 
opening to particular kinds of responsivity; and the way that a particular animal is made to 
appear to us within the context of a techno-scientific lab experiment. 
These challenges, combined with, first, the Derridean insights from the final section (i.e., 
l’animot; the ‘as such’/‘not as such’; originary suffering/violence), and, second, the 
 34 
 
characterization and criticisms of Heidegger’s account as the doubly impossible (i.e., the never-
there of self or other for animals), casts doubt on an easy recuperation of the project. Rather, I 
have offered some preliminary thoughts on rethinking animals as well as Heidegger’s concept of 
world: I think neither can be taken as realms of exclusive purity, enacted through the sacrificial 
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1 See Agamben (2004), Buchanan (2007, 2008), Calarco (2004, 2008), Derrida (1987, 1991, 
2008, 2011), Elden (2006), Franck (1991), Glendinning (1996), Haar (1993), Krell (1992), 
Leung (2010), Morris (2005), Winkler (2007). 
2 See Aho (2007), Bailey (2011), de Beistegui (2000), McNeill (1999), Naas (2010, 2014), Oliver 
(2014), Schalow (2006), Van Camp (2011), Withy (2013), and Wood (2004), in addition to the 
references in endnote 1, and many more. 
3 Derrida traces it through Plato (TATTIA 40), Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, and Lacan, 
for instance (TATTIA 14), as well as Genesis and Greek myths (e.g., TATTIA 15-8, 42). 
4 While Heidegger only uses Verbundenheit, and not Verbindlichkeit, to speak of the organism’s 
boundedness to its environment (FCM 258, 261, 264), he does importantly use Verbindung 
(FCM 258). Typically, Heidegger uses Verbind* words when he speaks of Dasein’s binding or 
non-binding in relation to boredom (FCM 135, 139, 165, 179, 182). Verbindlichkeit is mostly 
reserved for Dasein’s binding character (e.g., twenty times from FCM 339-365). However, with 
all that said, there does not seem to be any strict or rigorous division between the two root terms 
(Verbund* and Verbind*) in his later discussion of the apophantic statements (FCM 307-331, 
passim). As two examples: “‘Is’ and being then mean connectedness [Verbundenheit], ‘is’ 
means: something is connected [verbunden] with, stands in connection [Verbindung] with” 
(FCM 327); and: “The copula is no mere connecting [Verbindung] of words, but intervenes in 
the meaning of the words of an assertion, organizes them around one thing, makes them 
connected [verbunden] in this deeper sense” (FCM 329). That is, the root of the term that is used 
to describe the animal’s boundedness to its environment (Verbund*) is also used to describe the 
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deep ontological boundedness of the copula (the ‘is’), and so too is the root of the word that 
characterizes Dasein’s boundedness to beings (Verbind*). 
5 Regarding this “proper being,” Heidegger writes: “in this instinctual ‘toward’, the capacity as 
such becomes and remains proper to itself—and does so without any […] relating back to itself 
[….] We shall reserve the expression ‘self’ […] to characterize the specifically human 
peculiarity […]” (FCM 233). 
6 The disinhibitor is a conceptual way for us to understand a being in its role for the animal: a 
disinhibitor disinhibits a prescribed drive. Yet, if animals are open beyond a prescription, if they 
have a different kind of leeway than Heidegger claims, then a ‘disinhibitor’ is too narrow of a 
way to characterize how beings would ‘appear,’ because the being’s role would be expanded or 
altered (e.g., the being may be engaged with, or it may not). 
7 As such a totality, the animal would risk collapsing into the same (or similar) category of beings 
as the previously discussed apple and proton, insofar as it would lack access. The animal would 
have drivenness to distinguish it, but its drives are driven without any openness to its 
disinhibitors. It merely reacts to X, kind of like a fire would to breath. 
8 I put “external” in single quotes as it is questionable whether the animal, for Heidegger, can 
even have a perspective: i.e., perhaps the only perspectives are ours, as humans. 
9 If we absolutely could not go along with an animal, this would mean that we could not know 
anything about the animal. We must be able to go along with, even if such going along is, for 
Heidegger’s position, a not-going-along-with (see FCM 211). We must have access to the being 
in question, even if there is no question of it actually having access itself. 
10 For more on Derrida’s work on Heidegger and death, see, for e.g., Of Spirit (p 120), Aporias, 
The Animal That Therefore I Am, The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol. II. 
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11 We should keep in mind Heidegger’s methodological considerations: transposition “consists 
precisely in we ourselves being precisely ourselves, and only in this way first bringing about the 
possibility of ourselves being able to go along with the other being while remaining other with 
respect to it” (FCM 203). 
12 While Derrida does not discuss this in The Beast & the Sovereign, Vol. II, perhaps the 
impossibility could also relate to our birth. 
13 By pre-ontological difference I mean not only that animals precede ontological difference, 
precede the enabling disruption, but also that animals come before us, we come after them (see 
TATTIA 10-11). 
14 Derrida writes: “writing, obliteration of the proper classed in the play of differences, is the 
originary violence itself” (OG 110). Though this quote emerges in a very different context, it is 
pertinent here. Writing (arche-writing) is characterized by différance (see Derrida (1982), 3-27): 
the ‘constant’ deferral of meaning as part of a process of differentiation based on the unavoidable 
instability (spatial and temporal) of any given context. The proper, in my context, refers to the 
properness of the totality of animality: sealed, the animal is not exposed, whereas Dasein is 
exposed (P 144: i.e., ek-sistent), to beings/being. 
15 Agamben writes: “What the animal is precisely unable to do is suspend and deactivate its 
relationship with the ring of its specific disinhibitors” (68). 
16 Heidegger claims, without clarifying what he means, that “that which disinhibits, with all the 
various forms of disinhibition it entails, brings an essential disruption into the essence of the 
animal” (FCM 273). However, if the animal is always open to . . . , how is it disrupted? If the 
responses are pre-given, prescribed, how is there a disruption? Perhaps Heidegger means in 
terms of the eliminative need: disinhibitors force the animal to motion and response even though 
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the animal’s default position is, ontologically, absolute stasis (i.e., even if it is continually driven 
(FCM 243), it never ‘leaves,’ transcends, itself as Dasein does). I claim that what we have here is 
a disruption without disruption: the animal never leaves itself (nor, of course, does it ever find 
itself: one would have to resort again to crossing-out). 
17 Upon transgression, humans are open to death (Genesis 3:3, 3:19), knowledge of good and evil 
(ethics) (Genesis 2:9, 2:17, 3:5, 3:7), and struggle (Genesis 3:16-19). 
18 In Heidegger’s seminar, such ek-stasis is taken up as: first, originary projection (ursprüngliche 
Entwurf) (FCM 362-6); as well as—and Derrida helps us to see the following two—second, 
being-driven (Getriebenheit) (FCM 5; see B&S 101-2); and, third, Walten (FCM 26, 362, 365; 
see B&S 32, 38-44, 104, 116, 191, 215, 252, 278-90). 
19 As Krell puts it, “There are moments when for the sake of an endangered species of 
interpretation, [Heidegger] dispenses with his critique of modernity: Galileo and Descartes may 
initiate the epoch of subjectivity and calculative thinking, but at least they know that matter is 
extended, the moon pockmarked, and rocks lifeless” (DL 116). While there are some 
inaccuracies here, the point is that Heidegger simply brushes off other kinds of truth by insisting 
on the need to stay within the scientific-metaphysical approach. The only justification he gives is 
that this dimension of truth has “long since determined the way in which we conceive of truth in 
our everyday reflection and judgement, in our ‘natural’ way of knowing” (FCM 204), though this 
is an odd kind of justification, coming from Heidegger. 
Derrida touches on this problem: but “if one said to [Heidegger] that this repetition 
[towards the most originary] adds, invents or discovers nothing, that it merely redoubles 
hollowly […], Heidegger, I imagine, would reply: “in what you call the path of repetition which 
adds nothing (but what do you want to add? Do you find that what we have in our memory, the 
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abyss of our memory, is not enough?), the thinking of this […] is going towards what is quite 
other than what you recognize. It is indeed not a new content. […] The entirely other announces 
itself in the most rigorous repetition”” (OS 112-3). Yet, as Derrida points out, this is not always 
sufficient (see Derrida (1982), 134-6) and it remains regional (see OS 107-13). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that while it may be thought that Heidegger is open to the 
other forms of truth-disclosure as quoted, insofar as he does not simply dismiss animism, he may 
not be as open as may initially appear: he is careful to relegate such truth-disclosure to either 
myth or art (FCM 204). Yet, it may be problematic to do so (e.g., myth and art derive their sense 
from their pairing within binaries, and much would depend on how such terms and such binaries 
are understood). In our current context, which is not Derrida’s in Of Spirit, we could respond: 
yes, perhaps there is a need to go back, perhaps there is a need to repeat, but—and here we 
transition—such a tracing back could be older or other, either going further back or opening up 
to other accounts (e.g., in other traditions), so as to call into question such distinctions (art and 
myth / science and metaphysics) or matter/living/human (i.e., stone/animal/Dasein). 
20 Just as the standing-reserve is critiqued by Heidegger for its implications and effects for us 
(QCT 26-8), so too the sacrificial-reserve is impoverishing for us. I can only sketch out how this 
is so. The sacrificial-reserve is bound up with: the possibility of dehumanization; the constant 
work on ourselves to reaffirm our ‘non-animal’ nature; the suppression of concerns pertaining to 
vulnerability (see next section); the particular constitution of various binaries (e.g., 
reason/emotion); the smooth operation of the standing-reserve; and a sense of being ‘alone’ in 
the ‘world,’ in a monophonic or homophonic relation instead of a polyphonic one. 
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21 In other words, we strike them out ‘for’ the animal: “a generalized Durchstreichung” (TATTIA 
158), in which we cross-out not only all beings for the animal, including its self, but also all 
verbs, all actions. 
22 Heidegger is careful to distinguish animals (and organs) from machines (FCM 213-29), and so 
the latter—pure stimulus being—is more accurate. 
23 It is beyond the scope of this paper to venture a full positive account; nonetheless, I take this 
conclusion as a productive starting point. 
24 While I do not offer a theory of how to delimit a ‘kind’ of animal, this is the kind of difficulty 
that can lead to future fruitful thought. 
25 There is a problem of examples with animals because there is a problem with the category; for 
example, it is a problem to take emus or whales as exemplary. It could be responded, however, 
that there is an obvious different intent between Heidegger and myself: Heidegger maintains the 
example as exemplary whereas I use the example to question its exemplarity. 
26 Along these lines, it should be noted that, like Heidegger, I have let plants slide and focused on 
animals. That is, Heidegger begins by focusing on life and organisms and explicitly mentions 
plants and animals (and plants occasionally return later, too) (e.g., FCM 62, 177, 179, 188, 191, 
207), but he then mostly drops plants at some point (e.g., FCM 177-8, 185, 209). Further thought 
should be given to plants. 
27 This brings us back to a limitrophy—called for in The Animal That Therefore I Am (TATTIA 
29-31), and partly enacted in Aporias. See also Violence Against Animals (VAA 66, 72-3). 
